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ABSTRACT: This article discusses the myths surrounding
Russia’s A2/AD capabilities and the risks associated with the
current counter A2/AD efforts among NATO countries. It offers
recommendations for investing in a stronger defense of the Baltic
states and Eastern Europe.

R

eferences to Russia’s anti-access/area denial (A2/AD)
capabilities are now standard in assessments of America’s ability
to protect its allies and its interests in Europe. Unclassified
briefings on European military security now routinely include a slide
showing a map of Europe with the reach of advanced Russian interdiction
systems extending over a range of North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO) countries.
While awareness of the challenge posed by these capabilities
is important, widespread and often unqualified reporting in open
sources by both media outlets and nonspecialist think tanks has had
unfortunate consequences. Exaggeration and hype suggesting Russia
has the ability to interdict its adversaries across large areas of European
air and maritime space in particular leads to a distorted picture. If left
uncorrected, these inaccuracies could influence policy by constraining
response options for assertive Russian maneuvers. A public perception
that allied reinforcement of the Baltic states is not possible during a
time of conflict, for example, will falsely limit the options palatable to
US policymakers.
Neat circles on a map, while important for drawing attention to
the problem, also foster the public impression of “no-go zones” that
would be lethal for US or allied military assets. But Russian A2/AD
systems will not prevent NATO forces from getting to frontline states.
They could, however, prevent NATO from trying at all. This article,
therefore, seeks to mitigate this problem by countering the deliberate
effort of Russia to spread disinformation on its A2/AD systems.

Detail and Background

Since relations between Russia and the West entered their current
crisis in 2014, Western military analysis appears to have rediscovered
the classic use of interdiction capabilities as a tool of foreign policy.
While discussion of China’s A2/AD systems has been ongoing, Russia’s
recently increased activity in this domain has attracted sudden attention
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due to perceptions of Russian behaviors: unpredictability, irrationality,
and overt hostility toward the United States.
Russia’s systematic deployment of A2/AD capabilities along NATO’s
northeastern and southern flanks is a genuine cause for concern. These
offensive and defensive capabilities, especially in Kaliningrad and
Crimea, form a perimeter around Russia’s western periphery and into
the Mediterranean Sea and Syria. The apparent reach of Russian systems
over the airspace of key US allies, especially from Kaliningrad and the
Kola Peninsula, poses obvious challenges to freedom of movement in
times of crisis.

Map 1. Map of the Baltic and Black Sea region by Pete McPhail
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Nevertheless, public analysis routinely underestimates the
limitations of Russia’s interdiction systems imposed by the range and
effectiveness of their designated radars, the capabilities and limitations
of their missiles, and the constraints of geography. Additionally, there
has been little serious consideration of the policy limitations on Russian
employment of these systems in anything short of direct and open war.
Consequently, there is an urgent need to deconstruct exaggerated fears
around Russia’s A2/AD bastions.
Current Western public hype on this topic is detrimental to US
interests because the sense of Russian technological superiority it creates
emboldens Moscow. The relationship between Russian capabilities and
intentions can be addressed by closely examining the gap between what
Russian A2/AD systems can do and what the Kremlin wants US and
allied politicians to believe they can do. Even though the capabilities of
Russian interdiction assets have progressed significantly, they do not pose
an insurmountable threat to the NATO Alliance and US military forces.
Moreover, Russia’s conventional weapons systems do not represent
the totality of its capabilities for interdicting the movements of the
United States or its European allies. In times of crisis, when NATO
might seek to reinforce its easternmost member states, Moscow will likely
seek to deny joint reception, staging, onward movement, and integration
efforts by a wide range of nonmilitary measures such as conducting
cyberattacks, sabotaging logistics hubs, recruiting or coercing key
personnel, applying political pressure and subversion, and supporting
semideniable operations. While not part of classic A2/AD capabilities,
these gray-zone tools can deliver comparable effects and should be the
subject of future detailed study.1

Understanding Russian A2/AD
The term “anti-access/area denial” does not exist in Russian
military planning concepts or doctrine, except when discussing Western
capabilities.2 Like cyber and hybrid warfare, A2/AD is a Western
construct imposed on Russian military thought with no intrinsic value
in Russian military analysis. Contrary to what Western planners may
have been led to believe, the Russian General Staff applies the concept
merely to describe its perceptions of Western military actions.
Instead of a limited concept of exclusion using A2/AD capabilities
strategically, Russian military planning considers military operations as
a holistic approach that integrates assets. In this context, interdiction
capabilities represent one component among a broad and coordinated
range of others that make up a joint combat operation.3 Thus, A2/AD is
not an end in itself but rather an enabler for additional action.
1      Sam J. Tangredi, Anti-Access Warfare: Countering A2/AD Strategies (Annapolis, MD: Naval
Institute Press, 2013).
2      Dmitry Gorenburg, Michael Kofman, and Roger McDermott, “Russia’s A2/AD Doctrine,”
(unpublished paper, Center for Naval Analysis, n.d.).
3      Tomas Malmlöf (researcher, Swedish Defense Research Agency), interview by the author,
December 8, 2017.
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In addition to assigning maritime defense and territorial capabilities,
Russia’s military planners also create several layers of cross-domain
standoff systems, such as coastal, air defense, and anti-submarine warfare.
Any gaps in these conventional weapons are filled with electronic warfare
systems. Interdiction capabilities, therefore, are present “at almost every
level of the Russian Armed Forces,” especially within the Air Defense of the
Ground Forces (PVO SV).4
Russia’s continuity with the Soviet legacy of “concentric circles” to
protect territory, especially to conduct out-of-area operations in contested
maritime domains, creates Russia’s modern A2/AD capability.5 The
strategic bastions for conventional forces, especially in Kaliningrad, in
the Kola Peninsula (where the Northern Fleet is deployed), and in Crimea
(since its annexation in 2014) also provide examples of the influence of
Soviet logic on Russia’s interdiction capabilities.
This approach not only offers greater strategic depth but also deters
Russia’s near-peer competitors from attacking, avoiding escalation and
contact warfare.6 Interdiction capabilities are, therefore, a defense-indepth tool for deterrence, if not compellence, that limit the enemy’s
choices and freedom of action.7
Russian interdiction capabilities focus significantly on maritime
and littoral protection, especially in the Black Sea and the Baltic Sea.
Anti-submarine and costal air defense systems are therefore paramount
for effective A2/AD operations. Such capabilities are developed in line
with the current Russian naval strategy of strengthening the projectability of its fleet of smaller surface vessels (frigates and corvettes)
through the systematic procurement of standoff missile systems, such as
the 3M-14 Kalibr land-attack cruise missile, the P-800 Oniks surface-tosurface anti-ship cruise missile, and anti-submarine warfare capabilities.
Standoff assets—notably the Iskander short-range ballistic missiles,
the S-400 Triumf surface-to-air missiles, and the Kalibrs—deployed in
the region present an access challenge for US and NATO troops in the
event of a conflict with Russia. This vulnerability means NATO allies
will only be able to gain superiority after neutralizing or successfully
negotiating the interdiction threat. It also means Moscow would have an
early advantage in escalation control, especially during the initial phase of
a war.8 Reducing these interdiction capabilities would require combined
naval and air operations, and offensive capabilities that NATO does not
possess in the shared neighborhood of Eastern Europe.
Russia’s military presence in the region creates a “reinforcement
trap,” whereby (a) NATO reinforcements may risk interdiction from
4      Gorenburg, Kofman, and McDermott, “Russia’s A2/AD Doctrine.”
5      Guillaume Lasconjarias (researcher, NATO Defense College), interview by Keir Giles and
Mathieu Boulègue, December 7, 2017.
6      Matthew J. Wemyss, “The Bear’s Den: Russian Anti-Access/Area-Denial in the Maritime
Domain” (research paper, Air Command And Staff College, Air University, Maxwell AFB, AL,
May 2016).
7      Interview with US military expert, December 2017.
8      Gorenburg, Kofman, and McDermott, “Russia’s A2/AD Doctrine.”
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Russia and face important losses while (b) a lack of reinforcements
would decrease NATO’s security.9 It also means Moscow’s deterrence
strategy could successfully disrupt NATO’s decision-making process
and willingness to intervene. The net result would be a substantial
increase in the operational and strategic challenges the Alliance would
encounter while defending frontline states.10
Russia commonly demonstrates its air defense capabilities and
exploits the myth of A2/AD “bubbles” among its neighbors to sow doubt
among NATO allies. In doing so, the Kremlin uses Western insecurities
regarding ensured access to its advantage and feeds a perception that
NATO cannot operate effectively in a contested environment. The
ongoing debate thus becomes a self-constructed psychological threat
that reflects Western insecurities toward Russia, thus constituting a
way for the Kremlin to be blamed for the West’s capability shortfalls.11
Emboldened by this response, Moscow continues to expand its A2/AD
bubbles, and escalation dominance, on NATO’s eastern flank.12 In this
manner, intentions and threats deter adversaries as effectively as actual
military deployments.
The differences between notional maximum missile range in a
straight line, missile range when maneuvering, and radar detection range
are crucial to assessing A2/AD capability. Thus, simplistic assessments
that use a single figure for the theoretical range of Russia’s weapons are
highly misleading. Missiles mounted on the S-400 system, for example,
are routinely said to have a range of 400 km, but this range applies only
to large, nonmaneuvering targets flying at high altitudes, which limits
their application in operational terms.13
Furthermore, A2/AD environments are not glass domes that will
cause all systems to stop operating or functioning after they have been
penetrated.14 Although freedom of action and movement will be more
challenging in the presence of a missile threat and in an environment
where communications and command and control are degraded, it is
not necessarily impossible to operate there without first destroying the
defensive missile systems.
Russia does not have an inexhaustible quantity of precision-guided
missiles and, thus, is likely to expend its stocks cautiously. Russian A2/
AD systems can be saturated, therefore, and target acquisition and
engagement capabilities will also be as susceptible as any others to
failure against swarm attacks. To saturate Russian systems, however,
9      Fabrice Pothier, “An Area-Access Strategy for NATO,” Survival 59, no. 3 (2017): 73–80.
10      Luis Simon, “The ‘Third’ US Offset Strategy and Europe’s ‘Anti-access’ Challenge,” Journal
of Strategic Studies 39, no. 3 (2016): 417–45.
11      Jyri Raitasalo, “It Is Time To Burst the Western A2/AD Bubble,” Royal Swedish Academy
of War Sciences, June 16, 2017.
12      Luis Simon: “Demystifying the A2/AD Buzz,” War on the Rocks, January 4, 2017.
13      Robert Dalsjö, Christofer Berglund, and Michael Jonsson, “Bursting the Bubble: Russian
A2/AD in the Baltic Sea Region: Capabilities, Countermeasures, and Implications,” FOI-R--4651-SE (Stockholm: Swedish Defense Research Agency [FOI], 2019), 31.
14      John Richardson, “Chief of Naval Operations Adm. John Richardson: Deconstructing
A2AD,” National Interest, October 3, 2016.
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casualty-averse Western forces must expose themselves to risk and the
likelihood of losses. More broadly, risk and casualty acceptance is an
essential component of defeating Russia in the event of open conflict.

Recognizing Russian Bastions
To project power and to protect its outer approaches, Russia has
systematically positioned interdiction capabilities on the northern,
eastern, and southeastern flanks of the NATO Alliance in Europe.
This deployment includes several concentrations of A2/AD capabilities:
Kaliningrad, covering the Baltic Sea and the Scandinavian region;
Crimea, covering the Black Sea; and the High North, covering the
Barents Sea, the Kara Sea, and the Arctic region. Russia is also deploying
A2/AD systems in out-of-area locations such as Syria and the South
Caucasus. All of these areas demonstrate a pattern of positioning mobile
air defense systems supported with electronic warfare capabilities.
Baltic Sea. The Kaliningrad exclave represents a Russian forward
defense outpost located in the Baltic and Scandinavian region; thus, it is
key for Russia’s regional A2/AD architecture. Russia’s A2/AD assets in
Kaliningrad, mostly located around the naval bases harboring the Baltic
Fleet, create a tightly knit mobile air, sea, and land interdiction bastion.
Combined with mainland assets, the interdiction area essentially covers
the Baltic states, one-third of Poland, southern Scandinavia, and the
Gulf of Finland, as well as parts of Belarus. During the Zapad 2017
exercise, Russia’s armed forces used the exclave to practice an increased
forward presence and strategic air operations.15
As such, Kaliningrad presents the primary region NATO forces must
neutralize to guarantee unrestricted access and freedom of operation in
the Baltic Sea area.16 In the event of a crisis, however, Moscow could
swiftly deploy additional capabilities intended to convince NATO that
forced entry would be costly and potentially fruitless. Nevertheless,
Kaliningrad’s complicated geographical position renders it hard to defend
in a general conflict and the risk inherent in large-scale westward military
movements to preempt NATO operations would present a challenging
strategic choice for Russia.17 In a conflict, Kaliningrad would be entirely
isolated from Russia by land, barring invasion of Belarus, Poland, and
Lithuania. This represents a vulnerability for Russia that NATO allies
should openly acknowledge.
Kaliningrad will likewise prove complicated for NATO to deal with
as any military movement on behalf of the Baltic states would first need
to pass through Russia’s integrated layers of A2/AD assets. It follows
that, in a time of crisis, NATO would need to isolate Kaliningrad as
efficiently as possible to mitigate its own access vulnerabilities and to
15      Sergey Sukhankin, “Russia’s Changing Military-Strategic Perceptions of Kaliningrad Oblast
between 2013 and 2017,” Eurasia Daily Monitor 14, no. 140 (November 1, 2017).
16      Fredrik Westerlund, “Russia’s Military Strategy and Force Structure in Kaliningrad,” RUFS
Briefing no. 40 (Stockholm: FOI, 2017).
17      Stephan Frühling and Guillaume Lasconjarias, “NATO, A2/AD and the Kaliningrad
Challenge,” Survival 58, no. 2 (April-May 2016): 95–116; and Raitasalo, “It Is Time.”
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turn the exclave’s isolation into its own strategic advantage.18 Short
of hostilities, NATO could achieve this position by increasing force
posture in the region and using its own A2/AD capabilities such as air
and coastal defense systems and minelaying at sea.
Suwałki Gap. The Polish-Lithuanian border is emblematic of the
Kaliningrad conundrum. Instead of Kaliningrad itself becoming
isolated, Russia could potentially prevent land access to the Baltic states
during an armed conflict by blocking key road and rail assets in the
border area by moving in force or infiltrating from Kaliningrad or

Map 2. Map of the Baltic Sea by Pete McPhail

Belarus (if Minsk could be persuaded or induced to cooperate). Both
the initial move by the Kremlin onto NATO territory and any NATO
response intended to evict Russian troops would have a high potential
for escalation, with a presumption of an Article 5 discussion within
NATO. Any Russian intervention would, therefore, be designed to
remain deniable and below the threshold for a NATO response.
Gotland. In a crisis or an armed conflict, the Swedish island of
Gotland could be used preemptively to position Russian A2/AD
capabilities and to impose interdiction in the Baltic Sea. Mobile air
defense systems and electronic warfare capabilities there would severely
hinder NATO’s freedom of movement and reinforcement capabilities.
A bastion in this location could also isolate the Baltic states, the Gulf of
Riga, and the Gulf of Finland. Since Sweden is not a NATO member,
support from Sweden’s European partners and the United States, while
expected, could not be assumed. Moscow might consider such a move an

18      Frühling and Lasconjarias, “NATO.”
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acceptable risk, especially if other measures could prevent Sweden from
escalating responses to Russian action.
Åland Islands. Finland’s Åland Islands present a similar scenario
with the additional complication that they are demilitarized under treaty
and, therefore, unlike Gotland, have not been recently reinforced against
potential Russian intervention. The arrival of Russian A2/AD assets
there would both interdict Swedish and Finnish air and maritime space
for NATO forces reinforcing the Baltic states. But if astutely leveraged,
an expanding Russian presence could also present Finland with difficult
political choices over its support for the Western alliance.
Bornholm. Despite some similarities with Gotland and the Åland
Islands, Bornholm presents substantially greater challenges. The Danish
island also presents a hypothetical target if Russia preemptively places
interdiction assets there to block the Danish straits and the southern
Baltic Sea. Russian forces would need to cover a much greater distance
to reach Bornholm and would risk triggering an Article 5 response to
even a covert and denied military intervention in Denmark, a NATO
member state. Of the three popular “island grab” scenarios for Russian
action in the Baltic Sea, a move on Bornholm, therefore, appears the
least likely.
Crimea. Since its annexation in March 2014 and its subsequent
militarization, Crimea has, in many ways, transformed into a military
outpost, mirroring Kaliningrad, at the other end of Russia’s border
with Central Europe.19 From the seaport of Sevastopol and across the
peninsula, Russian armed forces have established a comprehensive and
multilayered A2/AD environment intended to challenge NATO allies
at sea and in the air, potentially complicating deterrence and reassurance
efforts in the region.20
Black Sea. With its regenerated capabilities, the Black Sea Fleet
has extended its interdiction assets. Air defense systems can potentially
reach as far as the ballistic missile defense assets deployed at Deveselu
Air Base in Romania while surface vessels and submarines can deploy
south toward Turkey and the Mediterranean. Compared to Kaliningrad,
Russian A2/AD capabilities in the Black Sea offer greater strategic
depth. Access for the United States and NATO could be potentially
restricted by a combination of anti-ship, anti-submarine, air defense, and
electronic warfare systems across multiple domains.
Yet the Black Sea does not constitute an environment in which
NATO forces face systematic or damaging interdiction. In fact, the
arena is far more open than it was during the Cold War when Bulgaria
and Romania were members of the Warsaw Pact. The Alliance would
still be able to reinforce its members in the region during an armed
conflict more easily than those in the Baltic Sea since the primary role of
19      Bleda Kurtdarcan and Barın Kayaoğlu, “Russia, Turkey and the Black Sea A2/AD Arms
Race,” National Interest, March 5, 2017.
20      George Vișan and Octavian Manea, “Crimea’s Transformation into an Access-Denial Base,”
Romania Energy Center, July 14, 2015.
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Russian A2/AD assets is to interdict NATO’s access to Russian territory
from the southern flank.21
The Russian approach to interdiction in the Black Sea reflects
NATO’s less pronounced presence and level of attention there and the
increased constraints of geopolitics.22 Should Russia decide to interdict
US or NATO forces in the Black Sea onwards to the Mediterranean,
it would have to extend the reach of its A2/AD sea-based assets to the
Turkish straits—a potentially dangerous situation risking escalation
with NATO. But differences of opinion between Turkey and the United
States, and instances of Bulgaria’s overt opposition to a NATO presence
there, complicate NATO’s goals for the region. In that sense, the level
of Russia’s offensive strategy in the Black Sea will heavily depend on
NATO’s posture in the region.23
High North and the Arctic. The High North and the Arctic
comprise the only officially designated region strategically important
to Russia. The Kola Peninsula is particularly vital for protecting the
Northern Fleet, one of the two Russian fleets that host submarines with
nuclear-powered missiles crucial to Moscow’s nuclear deterrent. The
Arctic region is also systematically depicted as paramount for Russia’s
future energy security.
In July 2017, Russia updated its naval strategy and for the first time
expressed in it clear Arctic ambitions.24 As these ambitions encompass
ensuring access for Russia and restricting the movement of potential
competitors, interdiction capabilities are instrumental to delivering
Russia’s Arctic strategy. The aim is to transform the region and its sea
lanes into a strategic base that projects power in the region and counters
the anticipated strategic competition for military access and energy
resources in the Arctic.
In late 2014, the Russian Ministry of Defense created a special
Arctic Joint Strategic Command, which included the Northern Fleet,
to secure Russia’s northern border and the Arctic and to increase its
military footprint in the region.25 Air defense forces and antiaircraft
defense systems are deemed a priority for the development of military
infrastructure in the Russian Arctic, both onshore and in the Arctic
Zone of the Russian Federation.26 The Northern Fleet is also operating
multilayered air defense and coastal defense capabilities. During 2018,
two Arctic motorized brigades were created and an Arctic naval group
21      Loic Burton, “Bubble Trouble: Russia’s A2/AD Capabilities,” Foreign Policy Association
(blog), October 25, 2016.
22      Sergey Sukhankin, “Russia Pours More Military Hardware into ‘Fortress Crimea,’ ” Eurasia
Daily Monitor 14, no. 147 (November 14, 2017).
23      Sukhankin, “Russia Pours.”
24      Dmitry Gorenburg, “Russia’s New and Unrealistic Naval Doctrine,” War on the Rocks, July
26, 2017; and Atle Staalesen, “What Russia’s New Navy Strategy Says about the Arctic,” Barents
Observer, August 3, 2017.
25      Roger McDermott, “Russia Creates Arctic Military Command,” Eurasia Daily Monitor 11, no.
215 (December 3, 2014).
26      “V Rossii sformirovana 45-ya armia VVS i PVO Severnogo flota” [The Northern Fleet 45th
Air and Air Defence Army was formed in Russia], RIA Novosti, January 29, 2016.
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was established. A new command and control center for the Northern
Fleet was also scheduled for delivery at the Severomorsk-1 airbase
during 2018.
In addition to structural changes in the Russian armed forces,
the Ministry of Defense has been remilitarizing the Arctic region by
investing in the construction and modernization of airfields and bases
in northern Siberia and on Novaya Zemlya and Franz Josef Land. These
facilities will eventually constitute a chain of air defense radar stations,
early warning assets, and electronic warfare systems. The Nagurskoye
airbase on Alexandra Land, Franz Josef Land, for example, is intended
to host Su-34s, MiG-31s, and a range of A2/AD systems.
All of these systems create a comprehensive front that could be used
to deny NATO naval and air forces access to the region, particularly to
the Barents Sea and onwards to the High North. Nevertheless, Russia’s
current interdiction capabilities in the Arctic remain incomplete and
relatively weak compared to other areas. Furthermore, Russia is not yet
able to threaten the North Atlantic sea-lanes between North America
and Europe.
Kola Peninsula. Harboring the Northern Fleet, the Kola Peninsula
is critically important not only to Russia’s but also Norway’s regional
defense and access to the High North. With the peninsula now heavily
equipped with A2/AD assets such as Iskanders, S-400s, and shorterrange Pantsir S-1 surface-to-air missiles, the reach of Russian interdiction
could potentially extend as far south as the Norwegian Sea. In addition
to interdiction capabilities, Russia’s bastion defense system is designed
to protect the nuclear assets of the Northern Fleet and safeguard secondstrike capabilities by keeping enemies away from the Kola Peninsula.
Svalbard. Even though Moscow has no stated plans to increase its
military footprint on the Norwegian archipelago of Svalbard, placing
interdiction assets in its vicinity could challenge US and NATO access
to the Norwegian and Barents Seas as well as hamper reinforcement
efforts along commercial sea lines. It could also strengthen its naval
presence surrounding Svalbard for the same effect, potentially without
violating the Svalbard Treaty that established a 200-nautical-mile
boundary around the archipelago. Such activities would also disrupt
coordination between NATO forces and Norway as well as their Swedish
and Finnish partners.
Syria. Russia’s use of A2/AD assets in Syria expands its A2/AD
coverage over the eastern Mediterranean and extends the reach of its
Black Sea interdiction assets. In addition to direct military goals, the
Russian A2/AD complex in Syria serves the purpose of suggesting to
foreign military forces that their access to the eastern Mediterranean
depends on Russia’s goodwill.27 These out-of-area assets are not
formidable, yet they are sufficiently capable of complicating the entry of
US and allied forces into the region. Russia bolstered its A2/AD assets
27     
Emily Kangas, “Containing NATO: Russia’s Growing A2/AD Capability in the
Mediterranean,” Georgetown Security Studies Review, February 21, 2017.
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and military presence in Syria with long-term lease agreements of the
port in Tartus and the Hmeimim airbase in Latakia. After declaring
“mission accomplished” in Syria during December 2017, Russia slowly
replaced the combat air wing in Hmeimim with more interdiction assets.
Meanwhile, Russia conversely relies on Turkey for the safe passage of
Russian naval assets and cargoes to and from Syria through the straits.28
South Caucasus. The South Caucasus also extends Russian A2/AD
coverage in the region. In June 2016, the Armenian parliament ratified a
bilateral united regional air defense system with Moscow, consolidating
interdiction capabilities for the Russian Southern Military District.29
The deployment of S-300 surface-to-air missiles at the Russian 102nd
base in Armenia during 2014 further strengthened Russia’s interdiction
capabilities over the eastern part of the Black Sea and eastern Turkey.30
Such assets could prove problematic for NATO reinforcements and
overflights in the eastern part of the Black Sea and Turkey.

Implications and Recommendations

Russian A2/AD is a multilayered problem that raises the costs of
deterrence by forcing NATO to make highly challenging military and
political decisions.31 Addressing this challenge requires acceptance of
risk. But facing the challenge is necessary for the United States and
NATO to maintain global freedom of movement and thus preserve
the credibility of the Alliance’s conventional deterrence. Allies must be
prepared either for kinetic action to neutralize defensive systems or for
complex operations in their areas of coverage. In a preconflict phase,
regional access has to be ensured while carefully managing the potential
for escalation that might increase the risk to NATO forces deploying
into a disputed environment.32

Debunk the A2/AD Myths
Russia maintains an advantage as long as its A2/AD capabilities
remain widely misunderstood. Even though the concept of A2/AD
is misapplied, it should not be abandoned as a term Western military
planners can use to explain Russia’s military modernization. The concept
also captures the evolution of Russia’s way of war to maintain deterrence
and territorial defense.33 Within NATO, A2/AD is a comprehensible
28      Jonathan Altman, “Russian A2/AD in the Eastern Mediterranean: A Growing Risk,” Naval
War College Review 69, no. 1 (Winter 2016): 72–84.
29      Eduard Abrahamyan, “Russia Creates Area Denial System in South Caucasus,” Central AsiaCaucasus Analyst, July 24, 2016; and “Соглашение между Российской Федерацией и Республикой
Армения о создании Объединенной региональной системы противовоздушной обороны в
Кавказском регионе коллективной безопасности,” Pravo.ru, October 28, 2015.
30      Eduard Abrahamyan, “Russia’s Newest A2/AD Sphere: The South Caucasus?,” National
Interest, June 19, 2016.
31      Vincent Alcazar, “Crisis Management and the Anti-Access/Area Denial Problem,” Strategic
Studies Quarterly 6, no. 4 (Winter 2012): 42–70.
32      Martin Zapfe and Michael Carl Haas, “Access for Allies?,” RUSI Journal 161, no. 3
(2016): 34–41.
33      Frühling and Lasconjarias, NATO; and Luis Simon, “Preparing NATO for the Future—
Operating in an Increasingly Contested Environment,” International Spectator 52, no. 3 (2017): 121–35.
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term useful to lobby for resources as well as the attention of policymakers.
Characterizing the Russian threat as A2/AD also helps to identify
Western shortcomings in technology and doctrine effectively.
The Army should lead America’s armed services, allied armed
forces, and the wider strategic community in debunking the myths
surrounding A2/AD through efforts such as conducting military
educational outreach programs and increasing information-sharing on
Russian interdiction capabilities. Of critical importance, the public and
political leaders should be included in efforts to communicate the real,
rather than notional, range and reach of Russian systems. In addition,
the impression that allied systems beyond that range are safe, but those
even slightly within that range are doomed is false and must be corrected.
The government should facilitate the Army’s education efforts since
any action against Russian capabilities will require public support.

Develop a Counter A2/AD Toolkit
Alongside the need to burst A2/AD bubbles, a comprehensive
approach for countering nontraditional A2/AD systems in the military
and political domains must be developed. A doctrinal “toolkit” could help
military planners and government policymakers adapt existing assets,
produce new assets, develop new procedures, and foster information
sharing to assess weaknesses and vulnerabilities in Russia’s capabilities.
The Army should lead the armed forces and NATO in the creation
of a counter A2/AD toolkit—consisting of assets, strategy, doctrine,
and political preparedness. By conducting exercises with NATO
allies, especially Sweden and Finland, possible A2/AD scenarios with
Russia can be tested to help anticipate Russia’s operational responses.
Military exercises for countering Russian A2/AD assets should be
held in the region as a way to demonstrate the Alliance’s readiness,
and to deter Russian aggression. The Army should also share data
from the collaborative exercises to inform NATO efforts to develop
a functioning doctrine to counter the Russian A2/AD threat. The
Army should encourage military leaders of partner nations to convey
the knowledge they gain during such exercises to their governments’
leaders to inform assessments of NATO’s conventional deterrence
posture. In this way, the Army can help NATO determine whether
new doctrine that encompasses Russia’s interdiction capabilities and its
implications should be developed or if the Readiness Action Plan should
be updated to ensure NATO members, especially the frontline states,
retain unimpeded access.34
The government should allocate funds and resources to facilitate
military measures to achieve kinetic and information superiority over
Russian A2/AD assets. By systematically engaging NATO partners,
including Sweden, Finland, Ukraine, and Georgia, the government can
reinforce the importance of a comprehensive approach to developing a
NATO strategy for countering Russia’s A2/AD challenge. The United
34      Pothier, “Area-Access Strategy”; and Alcazar, “Crisis Management.”
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States should continue to recognize the critical importance of Turkey
in regional security by avoiding policy decisions that could undermine
Turkish willingness to take assertive action in support of NATO.

Establish A2/AD Surveillance
Accurate knowledge of the movement of Russian A2/AD assets and
forces will help NATO anticipate future deployments of Russian A2/AD
and thus help mitigate the risks to US and NATO forces. Since increased
activity in the electromagnetic spectrum is considered an early indicator
of the activation of A2/AD assets, electronic warfare monitoring will
also be instrumental to maintaining a clear understanding of Russian
A2/AD capabilities.35
The Army should prioritize the development and fielding of
technologies that provide early detection of A2/AD and electronic
warfare assets as well as other intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance capabilities. Surveillance assets should yield information
about Russia’s command and control, communications, computers,
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities, which are
fundamental to assertive interdiction operations. The Army should
further deepen relationships with Norway, the Baltic states, and Poland,
as well as Sweden and Finland, to increase collaborative surveillance
capabilities and information- and intelligence-sharing arrangements and
to provide reassurance.
The government should encourage the Navy to expand maritime
surveillance and rotational presence, especially in the Black Sea and
on the northern flank of the Alliance members’ territory, as well as
to leverage relationships with its partners in the Baltic Sea to monitor
Russia’s A2/AD deployments.

Raise the Cost of Interdiction
The perceived costs to Russia for employing its interdiction assets
can be raised (and the perceived benefits can be reduced) by rendering
active use of A2/AD capabilities a less politically attractive option.
The Army should increasingly confront Russia with the technological
limitations of its A2/AD systems. When Alliance forces operate
uncontested and without degradation of their capabilities in a Russian
A2/AD environment, Moscow’s narrative on the invincibility of its
defenses is challenged. Key examples are US and allied strikes on Syria
in April 2017 and 2018.
The government should make the failure of Russian and
Russian-supplied defensive systems to engage incoming missiles—
whether due to a lack of capability or an operational decision—a key
component of its narrative on these systems. Care should be taken,
however, not to place excessive emphasis on the limitations of Russian

35      Jyri Raitasalo, “It Is Time.”
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systems since decisionmakers may then underestimate Moscow’s A2/
AD capabilities altogether.

Invest in Countering A2/AD Capabilities
As previous recommendations imply, the United States alone cannot
gain overwhelming out-of-area interdiction superiority against Russia.36
The Army can make Russian A2/AD operations harder to implement
and less effective. But military and technological superiority over Russia
is best leveraged through NATO allies working with frontline states to
develop the states’ capabilities in a coordinated and coherent manner
that avoids financial overburdening. Strengthening the defensive and
force protection capabilities of US and allied militaries to distribute
systems capable of countering Russian A2/AD reach more evenly would
complicate Russia’s interdiction capabilities.
The Army should support efforts to encourage frontline states to
build and operate a layered and integrated Alliance system of at least
minimal A2/AD capabilities. The Army should also rotate interoperable
counter A2/AD assets—especially regional air and missile defense
systems—in the Baltic states, Poland, and Norway within the framework
of the European Reassurance Initiative. Some counter A2/AD assets
that could extend protection in Eastern Europe include positioning
radars; elevated sensors; interceptors, intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance; and electronic warfare.
The government should encourage its NATO allies, such as the
Baltic states, Poland, and Denmark, and partners, such as Sweden and
Finland, to invest in their own A2/AD capabilities. It should encourage
NATO to reinforce multinational forces in Romania and Poland as well
as bolstering defensive measures there.37 America should demonstrate
its commitment to countering the Russian A2/AD threat by financially
assisting in the development of baseline adapted counter A2/AD assets,
particularly air defenses. The United States should also consider limited
technological transfers from the Third Offset Strategy to selected
NATO allies.

Conclusion

Russia might consider US investments in countering A2/AD
capabilities in Eastern Europe to be a threat to its security interests in
the shared neighborhood. Past patterns of Russian behavior suggest,
however, that despite alarmist rhetoric from Moscow, building counter
A2/AD capabilities would be seen more as a normal and natural
development of NATO’s defensive capability.
The United States must establish an accurate understanding of the
real threat posed by Russia’s A2/AD capabilities by educating the public
and policymakers. As a clearer picture of the threat emerges, America
36      Alexander Lanoszka and Michael A Hunzeker, “Confronting the Anti-Access/Area Denial
and Precision Strike Challenge in the Baltic Region,” RUSI Journal 161, no. 5 (2016): 12–18.
37      Altman, “Russian A2/AD.”
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can work to develop a counter A2/AD toolkit that can be used, first
by the US military and then NATO members and allied partners, to
respond to Russia’s A2/AD threat. The United States should establish a
network of surveillance systems that can monitor existing Russian assets
as well as new ones entering the shared neighborhood. These steps will
raise the technological and political costs of interdiction because Russia
will have to take steps to prove the validity of its rhetoric. It will not
be possible, however, to remove the risk completely or to eliminate
casualties entirely in the event of an open conflict.
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